Parametry
- 300 stránek
- 11 hodin čtení
Více o knize
What is the difference between a wink and a blink? The answer is important not only to philosophers of mind, for significant moral and legal consequences rest on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary behavior. However, "action theory" -- the branch of philosophy that has traditionally articulated the boundaries between action and non-action, and between voluntary and involuntary behavior -- has been unable to account for the difference.Alicia Juarrero argues that a mistaken, 350-year-old model of cause and explanation -- one that takes all causes to be of the push-pull, efficient cause sort, and all explanation to be prooflike -- underlies contemporary theories of action. Juarrero then proposes a new framework for conceptualizing causes based on complex adaptive systems. Thinking of causes as dynamical constraints makes bottom-up and top-down causal relations, including those involving intentional causes, suddenly tractable. A different logic for explaining actions -- as historical narrative, not inference -- follows if one adopts this novel approach to long-standing questions of action and responsibility.
Nákup knihy
Dynamics in Action, Alicia Juarrero
- Jazyk
- Rok vydání
- 2002
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- (měkká)
Doručení
Platební metody
Tady nám chybí tvá recenze.
- Titul
- Dynamics in Action
- Podtitul
- Intentional Behavior as a Complex System
- Jazyk
- anglicky
- Autoři
- Alicia Juarrero
- Vydavatel
- MIT Press
- Rok vydání
- 2002
- Vazba
- měkká
- Počet stran
- 300
- ISBN10
- 0262600471
- ISBN13
- 9780262600477
- Série
- Štítky
- Naučná literatura, Společenské vědy, Učebnice, Vysokoškolské učebnice, Psychologická tématika, Psychologie, Behaviorismus
- Hodnocení
- 4,35 z 5
- Anotace
- What is the difference between a wink and a blink? The answer is important not only to philosophers of mind, for significant moral and legal consequences rest on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary behavior. However, "action theory" -- the branch of philosophy that has traditionally articulated the boundaries between action and non-action, and between voluntary and involuntary behavior -- has been unable to account for the difference.Alicia Juarrero argues that a mistaken, 350-year-old model of cause and explanation -- one that takes all causes to be of the push-pull, efficient cause sort, and all explanation to be prooflike -- underlies contemporary theories of action. Juarrero then proposes a new framework for conceptualizing causes based on complex adaptive systems. Thinking of causes as dynamical constraints makes bottom-up and top-down causal relations, including those involving intentional causes, suddenly tractable. A different logic for explaining actions -- as historical narrative, not inference -- follows if one adopts this novel approach to long-standing questions of action and responsibility.


