J. Mark Ramseyer Knihy

Focusing on the intersection of law and economic growth in Japan, the author employs a rational-choice framework to analyze historical markets, particularly those deemed "exploitative," such as indentured servitude and sexual services. He highlights how Japanese courts established clear property rights and how market participants adeptly navigated informational asymmetries during contracts. The findings suggest that Japan's legal system fostered mutually beneficial agreements, leading to efficient economic growth without systematic exploitation based on sex or age.

The book explores the political evolution of Japan from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, focusing on the transition from oligarchic rule to military leadership. It investigates why the Meiji oligarchs failed to establish lasting institutions to maintain their power, employing a broader analytical framework applicable to oligarchies. The authors, J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, analyze the implications of these political choices on Japan's governance, economic growth, and international relations, contributing to a deeper understanding of regime change dynamics.

Many people interested in Japan have no background in economic theory of contracting; many people with that economic background have no knowledge of Japan; this book puts the two together.