Derek Parfit byl britský profesor filozofie, jehož práce se soustředila na osobní identitu, racionalitu a etiku. Zkoumal složité vztahy mezi těmito klíčovými filozofickými koncepty. Jeho přístup obohatil naše chápání toho, co znamená být osobou a jak bychom měli jednat. Parfitovo myšlení mělo hluboký dopad na moderní morální a metaetickou filozofii.
This is the first volume of a major work in moral philosophy, the long-awaited follow-up to Parfit's classic Reasons and Persons, a landmark of 20th-century philosophy. Parfit presents a powerful new treatment of reasons and a critical examination of the most prominent systematic moral theories, leading to his own ground-breaking conclusion.
Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interests, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions that most of us will find very disturbing.