Dennis C. Mueller Knihy

Focusing on the main ideas and contributions to public choice theory, this five-part volume offers a comprehensive overview of the field. It explores the interplay between economics and political science, examining how individuals' choices within political systems impact governance and policy outcomes. Each section delves into key concepts and influential works, making it a valuable resource for understanding the complexities of decision-making in the public sphere.

Exploring the concept of profitability, this book investigates whether lasting disparities exist among firms in terms of their financial performance. It delves into the factors that contribute to these differences, examining various industries and economic conditions to understand the underlying reasons for sustained profitability variations. The analysis aims to provide insights into the dynamics of competitive advantage and the implications for business strategy and investment decisions.

Joseph Schumpeter oscillated in his view about the type of economic system that was most conducive to growth. In his 1911 treatise, Schumpeter argued that a more decentralized and turbulent industry structure where the pro cess of creative destruction was triggered by vigorous entrepreneurial ac tivity was the engine of economic growth. But by 1942 Schumpeter had modified his theory, arguing instead that a more centralized and stable industry structure was more conducive to growth. According to Schum peter (1942, p. 132), under the managed economy there was little room for entrepreneurship because, "Innovation itself is being reduced to routine. Technological progress is increasingly becoming the business of teams of trained specialists who turn out what is required to make it work in pre dictable ways" (p. 132). Schumpeter (1942) reversed his earlier view by arguing that the integration of knowledge creation and appropriation be stowed an inherent innovative advantage upon giant corporations, "Since capitalist enterprise, by its very achievements, tends to automize progress, we conclude that it tends to make itself superfluous - to break to pieces under the pressure of its own success.

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As in the previous editions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include: why the state exists, voting rules, federalism, the theory of clubs, two-party and multiparty electoral systems, rent seeking, bureaucracy, interest groups, dictatorship, the size of government, voter participation, and political business cycles. Normative issues in public choice are also examined. The book is suitable for upper level courses in economics dealing with politics, and political science courses emphasizing rational actor models.