At the tactical level of war, the Germans are often seen as the most innovative and proficient army of World War I. However, historians agree that they faced serious strategic shortcomings. The operational level of warfare, which lies between tactical and strategic levels, presents a more complex evaluation. Although the concept of operational art was only fully recognized by Western militaries in the 1980s, German military thinking prior to World War I identified this realm of warfare. Nonetheless, their understanding of operational art was flawed, resembling tactics on a grand scale, which ultimately cost them dearly in both World Wars. This study examines the German operational approach through an analysis of the Ludendorff Offensives of 1918. While these major attacks achieved impressive tactical outcomes, they left Germany in a weakened strategic position by August 1918. Key operational errors included a failure to recognize the importance of sequential operations and cumulative effects, as well as a reliance on direct force-on-force attacks. The Allies, particularly the British, had vulnerabilities that the Germans could have exploited. Their logistics and rail systems were fragile, with critical choke points at Amiens and Hazebrouck. Although the Germans nearly captured these rail centers during Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, they did not fully appreciate their operational significance. This oversight, along with th
