Logic, ontology, and language

Written within the tradition of analytic philosophy, the present work deals with criticisms of contemporary nominalism, materialism and idealism. Realism about universals and a correspondence theory of truth are defended against the attacks of major figures such as Quine, Sellars, Goodman and Davidson. Taken together, the essays offer one of the most systematic attacks on nominalism and defenses of realism in recent philosophical literature. The realistic account of predication involves theories of truth and reference that are derived from the work of Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and Bergmann. The essays also present critical analyses of major themes in the writings of Frege and Carnap. The accounts of predication, reference and truth provide a basis for an analysis of thought and intentionality, as wall as a framework for considering the problems posed by logical concepts, negation, false belief, facts, and possibilities. Russell's account of reference, description, logical form, and identity arc considered in detail, as are Quine's uses of Russellian themes to defend his conception of ontological commitment and his view of proper names. Criticisms of Russell's account of reference and description and alternative accounts, offered by Strawson and others, are critically evaluated. The essays concentrate on ontological issues behind fundamental problems in the philosophy of logic and language. Taken together they present an interrelated and systematic attempt to resolve the ontological problems posed by reference, predication, and truth. Of interest to: Philosophers, logicians, linguists, historians of contemporary philosophy