Logic, ontology, and language

This work engages critically with contemporary nominalism, materialism, and idealism, defending realism about universals and a correspondence theory of truth against prominent philosophers like Quine, Sellars, Goodman, and Davidson. The collection of essays represents a systematic critique of nominalism and a robust defense of realism, drawing on the theories of truth and reference from Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, and Bergmann. It includes critical analyses of key themes in the writings of Frege and Carnap, establishing a foundation for examining thought and intentionality, as well as addressing issues related to logical concepts, negation, false belief, facts, and possibilities. Detailed discussions on Russell's theories of reference, description, logical form, and identity are presented, alongside an evaluation of Quine's adaptation of Russellian ideas regarding ontological commitment and proper names. Alternative accounts of reference and description, notably those by Strawson, are also scrutinized. The essays focus on the ontological dimensions underlying essential problems in the philosophy of logic and language, collectively aiming to address the ontological challenges associated with reference, predication, and truth. This work will appeal to philosophers, logicians, linguists, and historians of contemporary philosophy.