Charles F. Brower Knihy

American strategists in the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the deep connection between political and military strategy during World War II, particularly in the conflict against Japan. They believed that war stems from political origins and aims to achieve political goals, which shape both the objectives of the war and the subsequent peace. Emphasizing the importance of policy as the guiding force in warfare, the book explores how this understanding influenced strategic decision-making, reflecting Clausewitz's views on the interplay between war and politics.

In the final year of World War II in Europe, a distinguished group of international scholars addresses key military and political questions through a collection of essays that explore strategic, operational, tactical, and human perspectives. The volume begins with fresh assessments of Roosevelt and Churchill's strategic contributions, followed by analyses of operational warfare. David Eisenhower reevaluates his grandfather's "broad front" strategy as Supreme Allied Commander, while other essays delve into topics such as the strategic bombing campaign, Germany’s defensive maneuvers, and the impact of military geography on operations in the Netherlands, particularly the MARKET-GARDEN campaign. The challenges faced by Canadian forces in clearing the "long left flank" and opening the Scheldt estuary are also examined. The volume concludes by addressing the human dimension of warfare, combining first-hand accounts with historical analysis to depict experiences during battles in the Ardennes and on Walcheren Island, alongside the perspectives of Dutch non-combatants adapting to liberation. This collection offers a balanced examination of the war in Europe from D-Day to V-E Day, enhancing the understanding of the complex challenges encountered in concluding this significant conflict.