Bruce Bueno de Mesquita Knihy

Two renowned political scientists show how the rules of politics almost always favor leaders who ignore the national interest and focus on serving their own supporters.

"This is an intro-level text that teaches how to think clearly and conceptually about quantitative information, emphasizing ideas over technicality and assuming no prior exposure to data analysis, statistics, or quantitative methods. The books four parts present the foundation for quantiative reasoning: correlation and causation; statistical relationships; causal phenomena; and incorporating quantitative information into decision making. Within these parts it covers the array of tools used by social scientists, including regression, inference, experiments, research design, and more, all by explaining the rationale and logic behind such tools rather than focusing only on the technical calculations used for each. New concepts are presented simply, with the help of copious examples, and the books leans towards graphic rather than mathematical representation of data, with any technical material included in appendices"--

The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.

Lucid and compelling, this is an essential guide to the turbulent future of Hong Kong. The authors begin with a concise historical overview, tracing how Hong Kong with its unique geographical setting, "textbook" freemarket economy, and industrious population, developed into one of the world's richest territories. Based on their own expertise in policy choices and a collection of data from a wide range of expert observers, the authors applied a scientific model of decision making to Hong Kong's unknown future.

"This book solves one of the great puzzles of history: why did the West become the most powerful civilization in the world? Political scientist Bruce Bueno de Mesquita explains the consolidation of power in the West through a single, little noticed event: the 1132 Concordat of Worms. Bueno de Mesquita makes a deeply researched and persuasive case that the Concordat changed the terms of competition between churches and nation-states, incentivizing economic growth and benefiting citizens over kings and popes. In the centuries since, those countries that have had similar arrangements have been consistently better off than those that did not"-- Provided by publisher

The fifth edition by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita offers a refined exploration of international relations, emphasizing the strategic factors behind war, peace, and world order. Drawing on extensive feedback, this edition enhances clarity and precision, making complex concepts more accessible. The author’s scientific approach continues to set a benchmark in the field, providing readers with a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics that shape global interactions.

To predict likely policy developments around the world over the next thirty years, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita uses game theoretic models as described in Predicting Politics. The tools used in this book have found wide application in business and in the development of significant American foreign policy initiatives over the years. The author uses data from 1948 to show the ability of models to predict the end of the Cold War. He then turns to data from 1980 for about one hundred countries and simulates future states of the world, especially with regard to further democratization. In the process he shows strong evidence that the burst of democratization that occurred at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s was predictable based on replicable data known in 1980. While delving into rather gloomy predictions about likely developments in Russia and China's domestic affairs, he offers a novel explanation for the failure of Russia to attract more investment and to achieve the higher growth rates commonly associated with democratic government. Although Russia is certainly more democratic in an absolute sense today than it was in 1980, it has fallen farther behind the rest of the world in terms of democratization and so lacks the comparative advantages of property rights, rule of law, and transparent governance that are essential for attracting investment. Bueno de Mesquita shows how policy situations and game theoretical analyses can explain the past, illuminate the present, and forecast future events. At the same time he provides the tools necessary for others to create their own rigorous estimates of future foreign policies.

Explores the political careers of Ronald Reagan and Boris Yeltsin, who overcame defeat early in their political careers and rose to the highest elected offices in their respective countries