Indonesia's presidential democracy - a factor of stability or instability?

The following study examines the effects of formal institutions on political output in current Indonesia. Following four constitutional amendments and the passage of a new election law, these formal rules of the political game have changed considerably and thus warrant a new focus in Indonesian research. Against the backdrop of veto player theory, the legislative process is described and analysed. This includes key legislation such as the Law on the Governance of Aceh and the draft laws on pornography, military courts, freedom of information, state secrets, state ministries and legislative and executive elections. The result is that legislative gridlock in Indonesia is largely a function of the country’s presidential and multiparty governmental system. This can be remedied through the creation of a parliamentary democracy and an effective electoral threshold aimed at reducing the number of parties allowed to enter parliament. In addition, the consensus rule in legislative decision-making should be abandoned. However, informal rules of behaviour – corruption and a politicised military – continue to beset post-Suharto Indonesian politics. As these rules generally develop and become entrenched over an extended period of time, the country’s historical pathway is also examined. With more than 30 years of New Order abuses and a transition that was marked by the state elites’ decision-making, adverse informal institutions have largely stayed intact and thus diminish the quality of Indonesia’s democracy today.