Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals

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An innovative reassessment of philosopher P. F. Strawson's influential "Freedom and Resentment," Pamela Hieronymi's work closely reexamines the 1962 paper, revealing that Strawson's argument has been underestimated and misunderstood. Hieronymi meticulously untangles the complex strands of Strawson's ideas, elucidating his conception of moral responsibility and the distinction between "reactive" and "objective" responses to others' actions and attitudes. She addresses Strawson's central argument that determinism, being a general thesis applicable to everyone at all times, does not negate moral responsibility. Hieronymi critiques the two prevalent interpretations of this argument—the "simple Humean interpretation" and the "broadly Wittgensteinian interpretation"—finding both inadequate. By drawing on Strawson's broader work in logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics, she identifies an implicit, previously overlooked metaphysics of morals grounded in Strawson's "social naturalism." In her final chapter, Hieronymi defends this naturalistic perspective against objections. This rigorous and insightful analysis sheds new light on Strawson's thinking and carries significant implications for future explorations of free will, moral responsibility, and metaethics.