Miranda Priebe Knihy

Tracing the evolution of the U.S. Army throughout American history, the authors of this four-volume series show that there is no such thing as a "traditional" U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and a series of legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940. Volume IV covers the period from 1970 to 2015, from changes to U.S. military policy that resulted from the Vietnam War through years of persistent conflict following the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks. In spite of significant changes in the strategic context during this period, the fundamental laws underpinning U.S. military policy remained largely unchanged. Volume IV also discusses how the demands of persistent conflict since the 9/11 terrorist attacks have led to increased use of individuals and units from the reserve components

Tracing the evolution of the U.S. Army throughout American history, the authors of this four-volume series show that there is no such thing as a "traditional" U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and a series of legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940. Volume III covers the period from 1940 to 1970 and examines how the Army, while retaining the basic legal underpinning established by 1940, evolved in light of the radically different security requirements associated with the nation's emergence as a superpower and the need to maintain forces overseas and to rapidly respond in support of alliance commitments. The wars in Korea and Vietnam, and associated debates best to generate the required forces and how to balance military requirements with political concerns, led ultimately to the development of Total Force Policy: an effort to eliminate the need for conscription, except in special circumstances, and to further professionalize U.S. military forces

The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy called for the military to enhance operational unpredictability to deter attacks on U.S. partners. This report defines U.S. operational unpredictability as adversary uncertainty regarding U.S. combat strategies. It outlines four potential approaches to increase this unpredictability and evaluates their implications for U.S. relations with Russia and China. Additionally, it analyzes two Cold War-era instances where the U.S. aimed for greater operational unpredictability. The findings suggest that enhancing adversaries' perceptions of U.S. unpredictability may be achievable with insights into their operational analysis and decision-making. Publicizing new U.S. capabilities could be the most effective method, showcasing multiple options for achieving strategic objectives. However, pursuing operational unpredictability may incur costs and negative consequences, such as diminished military effectiveness and heightened threat perceptions from China and Russia. The authors advise carefully considering the potential costs and effectiveness of these strategies compared to traditional deterrence methods.